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UNITED STATES v. MARCHETTI AND
ALFRED A. KNOPF, INC. v. COLBY:
SECRECY 2; FIRST AMENDMENT 0
By David H. Ryan*
Just ten months after the Supreme Court denied the federal gov-
ernment an injunction that would have prohibited the further publica-
tion of the Pentagon Papers by The New York Times and The Wash-
ington Post,' government attorneys again went to court to restrain pub-
lication-this time with more success. In this case, the Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA) sought an injunction to prevent former agent
Victor Marchetti from publishing a book based on his experiences in
the CIA.
Invoking a secrecy agreement which he had signed when he
joined the agency,2 the trial court ordered Marchetti to submit the book
to the CIA for authorization prior to publication. On appeal the order
was modified to permit CIA authorization to be withheld only for fac-
* Member, third year class.
1. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
2. The relevant provisions of the agreement are:
"SECRECY AGREEMENT
1. 1, Victor L. Marchetti, understand that by virtue of my duties in the Central
Intelligence Agency, I may be or have been the recipient of information and intelligence
which concerns the present and future security of the United States. This information
and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified
according to security standards set by the United States Government. I have read and
understand the provisions of the espionage laws, Act of June 25, 1948, as amended,
concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am
familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.
2. I acknowledge, that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or
claim, in or to any of the information or intelligence or any method of collecting or
handling it, which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection
with the Central Intelligence Agency, but shall always recognize the property right of the
United States of America, in and to such matters.
3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish or reveal either by word,
conduct, or by any other means, any classified information, intelligence or knowledge
except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the
United States, unless specifically authorized in writing, in each case, by the Director of
Central Intelligence or his authorized representatives. . . ." United States v. Marchetti,
466 F.2d 1309, 1312 n.1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
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tual items relating to classified documents obtained while Marchetti was
employed by the CIA.3 The CIA subsequently refused to authorize
339 items, comprising approximately twenty per cent of the book.4
Marchetti, his co-author, and their publisher, Alfred A. Knopf Inc.,
filed suit to restore the 339 items. The CIA later voluntarily released
half of the previously unauthorized material. Thereafter, The CIA and
the Cult of Intelligence was published with 168 items still deleted.
Nearly all of these deletions were upheld in the second suit. 5
Although these cases presented an apparent conflict between the
First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and the press and the
governmental interest of national security, this issue was circumvented
by the court's enforcement of the secrecy agreement under traditional
contract theory. After a review of the Marchetti and Knopf cases, this
note will analyze the standard that has emerged from those cases in
which the government has sought to condition employment on the sur-
render of a constitutionally protected right. The standards of the First
Amendment will be reviewed, emphasizing the role of judicial review
in prior restraint cases. The New York Times decision will then be
analyzed, including some assumptions and conclusions that follow from
the Court's denial of the injunction that would have halted publication
of the Pentagon Papers. Finally, this note will balance the principles
derived from New York Times with the contract theory applied in
Marchetti and Knopf in an attempt to formulate a standard for the en-
forcement of secrecy agreements that will protect both the need for
secrecy and First Amendment rights.
I. The Cases
A. United States v. Marchetti
Victor Marchetti was an employee of the CIA from 1955 to 1969,
ultimately attaining the post of executive assistant to the deputy direc-
tor. In 1969, Marchetti resigned from the agency because he ques-
tioned the CIA's role in foreign affairs and he feared the CIA's possible
involvement in domestic activities. 6 Two years later he expressed
3. Id. at 13,17-18.
4. V. MARCHETTI AND J. MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE XXV
(1974) [hereinafter cited as MARCHETTI AND MARKS].
5. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 992 (1975).
6. See Otis, Spooking the Spooks: The Victor Marchetti Story, RAMPARTS, Dec.,
1972, at 8; Delong, A Former Staff Officer Criticizes CIA Activities, U.S. NEws AND
WORLD REPORTS, Oct. 11, 1971, at 78. For a detailed report of abuses by United States
intelligence agencies, see FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACITIrIES, S. REP. No.
94-755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT].
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criticisms of the agency in a novel7 and a magazine article,8 as well as
in several radio and television interviews. Alarmed by the revelations
in those writings, interviews, a planned Esquire article, and an outline
of a proposed non-fiction book about the CIA that Marchetti had cir-
culated to publishers, the CIA sought an injunction prohibiting publica-
tion of the Esquire article and the non-fiction book unless Marchetti
complied with the secrecy agreement he had signed.9 The complaint
alleged that disclosure of the information in the Esquire article and the
outline for the book would violate the secrecy agreement and would
result in "grave and irreparable damage to the interests of the United
States."' 0
1. The District Court
After an ex parte hearing, Federal District Judge Albert V. Bryan
issued a temporary restraining order directing Marchetti to submit to
the CIA any manuscript concerning the agency thirty days prior to pub-
lication." Judge Bryan found that:
[i]mmediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to
the plaintiff before a hearing can be had on the plaintiff's motion
for a preliminary injunction, in that defendant Victor L. Marchetti
• . .has violated the terms and conditions of his secrecy agree-
ments with the Central Intelligence Agency by disclosing on numer-
ous occasions classified information relating to intelligence sources
and methods, which information was entrusted to the defendant in
confidence in connection with his employment .... 12
Marchetti moved to dissolve the temporary restraining order, filing
an affidavit that stated:
My years of experience in the Agency have led me to believe that
the CIA and United States intelligence have grown beyond the
actual needs of the nation. There is a great deal of redundancy,
waste and inefficiency in the intelligence business today, and many
of the operations undertaken by the CIA and other intelligence
agencies are counter-productive and harmful to the nation. Such
activities, unrelated to the national security, would not be tolerated
by an informed public and an informed Congress. I believe that
the CIA's action in this case has been taken, not to protect national
security, but to prevent embarassment to the Agency which would
7. V. MARCHETrI, THE RoPE DANCER (1971).
8. Marchetti, CIA: The President's Loyal Tool, THE NATION, April 3, 1972, at
430.
9. Brief for Appellant at 2, United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.
1972).
10. Id. at 6.
11. Temporary Restraining Order at 3, United States v. Marchetti (E.D. Va., Apr.
18, 1972).
12. Id. at 1.
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result from public knowledge of the activities and policies I have
just mentioned.
13
District Judge Bryan denied Marchetti's motion to dissolve the
temporary restraining order. At the hearing on the permanent in-
junction, the CIA presented two witnesses. 14  During cross-examina-
tion of one of these witnesses Marchetti questioned the basis for the
witness's conclusion that disclosure of the items contained in the
Esquire article would injure national security. The CIA objected to
this questioning. In sustaining the objection, District Judge Bryan re-
jected the defendant's First Amendment claims.' 5 This ruling obvi-
ated the necessity for the CIA to show immediate and irreparable in-
jury to national security despite the fact that this was the basis of two
of the complaint's allegations.
The adverse ruling on the First Amendment claims eviscerated
Marchetti's case. He had been prepared to call four crucial wit-
nesses-three university professors" and Morton Halperin, former dep-
uty assistant secretary of defense and subsequently senior staff mem-
ber of the National Security Council-who were to testify that neither
the Esquire article nor the outline of the proposed book included any
information that would jeopardize national security.' 7 When District
Judge Bryan precluded Marchetti's First Amendment claims their testi-
mony became irrelevant; however, it was proferred to preserve the is-
sue for appeal.
District Judge Bryan issued a permanent injunction requiring
Marchetti to submit the manuscript to the CIA prior to publication,
stating:
[T]he contract takes the case out of the scope of the First Amend-
ment; and to the extent the First Amendment is involved, the con-
tract constitutes a waiver of the defendant's rights thereunder. It
is these documents that the Court feels distinguish this case from
New York Times [sic] v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and
render it no more than a usual dispute between an employer re-
garding the revelation of information obtained by that employee
during his employment. Consequently, there is no prior restraint
13. Brief for Appellant at 8, United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.
1972).
14. The CIA's witnesses were Thomas Karamessines, then a deputy director of the
CIA, and Howard J. Osborn, CIA director of security. Id. at 6, 11, 13. Most of their
testimony was taken in camera, and has been sealed. Id. at 11.
15. Id.
16. The professors were Abram Chayes, professor at Harvard Law School and
former legal advisor to the Department of State; Richard Falk, professor of international
law at Princeton University; and Paul Blackstock, of the School of International Affairs,
University of South Carolina and an expert on intelligence organizations. Id. at 12-13.
17. All four of these experts were given security clearances that enabled them to
study the evidence presented. Id. at 9 (footnote).
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and no such heavy burden on the United States to show irreparable
damage to the country as was imposed by the New York Times.18
2. The Court of Appeals
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the injunction, but
limited its scope to items involving classified documents in accordance
with the provisions of the secrecy agreement. 9 Writing for the court,
Chief Circuit Judge Clement Haynsworth recognized that Marchetti did
have First Amendment rights, which he summarized as follows:
We readily agree with Marchetti that the First Amendment
limits the extent to which the United States, contractually or other-
wise, may impose secrecy requirements upon its employees and en-
force them with a system of prior censorship. It precludes such
restraints with respect to information which is unclassified or offi-
cially disclosed, but we are here concerned with secret information
touching upon the national defense and the conduct of foreign af-
fairs, acquired by Marchetti while in a position of trust and con-
fidence and contractually bound to respect it.20
Thus the inapplicability of the First Amendment resulted from the
way in which the contract was narrowly drawn to protect only classified
information. The court concluded that because Marchetti would not
have learned this classified information had he not signed the agree-
ment, the agreement should be enforced to protect that information. 21
Protection of classified information is essential because protection
against foreign threats is an extremely important interest. Conse-
quently, the protections of the Bill of Rights must yield to national se-
curity interests in some instances. This was recognized by the Su-
preme Court in dicta in Near v. Minnesota,"2 where the Court spoke
of the government's right to censor publication of ships' sailing dates
during times of war. Thus while the First Amendment protects com-
ment on the conduct of foreign affairs, when that speech becomes "in-
consistent with the national interest" it may be suppressed. 23
Because the conduct of foreign affairs has been entrusted to the
executive branch, the means of protecting secrecy also rest with the
executive. In several cases the Supreme Court has recognized in dicta
the validity of executive measures protecting secret information. 2  In
18. Id. at 15.
19. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317-18 (4th Cir. 1972).
20. Id. at 1313.
21. Id. at 1316-17.
22. 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
23. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1315 (4th Cir. 1972).
24. See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103 (1948); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936); E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 37 (1918).
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addition, the legislative branch has indicated its support for such meas-
ures by enacting criminal codes to protect the executive's classification
system. Referring to such criminal codes, the circuit court in Marchetti
stated:
One may speculate that ordinary criminal sanctions might suffice
to prevent unauthorized disclosure of such information, but the risk
of harm from disclosure is so great and maintenance of the confi-
dentiality of the information so necessary that greater and more
positive assurance is warranted. Some prior restraints in some cir-
cumstances are approvable of course.
25
Because protection of national security is of paramount importance and
because criminal sanctions would operate only after the release of the
information, the court concluded that the government should have a
means by which it could prevent those persons holding classified mate-
rial from releasing it. Thus, secrecy agreements were held to be a rea-
sonable means for the government to protect its internal secrets. 26
Having found the secrecy agreement enforceable, the court then
turned to an examination of Marchetti's rights:
Marchetti by accepting employment with the CIA and by signing
a secrecy agreement did not surrender his First Amendment right
of free speech. The agreement is enforceable only because it is
not a violation of those rights. We would decline enforcement of
the secrecy oath signed when he left the employment of the CIA
to the extent that it purports to prevent disclosure of unclassified
information, for, to that extent, the oath would be in contravention
of his First Amendment rights.
Thus Marchetti retains the right to speak and write about the
CIA and its operation, and to criticize it as any other citizen may,
but he may not disclose classified information obtained by him
during the course of his employment which is not already in the
public domain.
2 7
Furthermore, the court acknowledged that because it was "dealing with
a prior restraint upon speech," Marchetti's First Amendment rights
allowed him to seek judicial review if the CIA restrained publication
of any material. 28 Such judicial review, however, would be limited to
two questions: whether the information that Marchetti sought to reveal
was classified, and, if so, whether the classified material had already
come into the public domain.
29
The court offered two reasons for declining to review the classi-
fied materials. First, the classification system is an executive function
25. 466 F.2d at 1347 (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 1316.
27. Id. at 1317.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1318.
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under the executive power to conduct foreign affairs and the judicial
branch has generally declined to review the executive's foreign affairs
activities. Consequently, as an executive prerogative, the operation of
the classification system would not be judicially reviewable s0  Second,
the court believed that the judiciary lacks sufficient information to de-
termine which materials would be harmful if disclosed. Chief Judge
Haynsworth stated:
There is a practical reason for avoidance of judicial review of
secrecy classifications. The significance of one item of information
may frequently depend upon knowledge of many other items of in-
formation. What may seem trival to the uninformed, may appear
of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and
may put the questioned item of information in its proper context.
The courts, of course, are ill-equipped to become sufficiently
steeped in foreign intelligence matters to serve effectively in the re-
view of secrecy classifications in that area.31
In his concurrence, Circuit Judge Craven agreed with the majority
except that he did not share the majority view denying judicial review
of executive classifications. Citing increased emphasis on the public's
right to know, 32 he would have established a presumption of reason-
ableness for all classifications of documents. This presumption would
impose the burden of proving the unreasonableness of the classification
on the one assailing it. This burden could be met only by clear and
convincing evidence that the classification was arbitrary and capri-
cious.
33
B. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby
Despite the legal setback occasioned by the Marchetti decision,
Marchetti started to write the book. 4 John Marks, a former State De-
partment official, joined him as a co-author. Upon completion of the
book in late 1973, they gave a copy of the manuscript to the CIA for
review. The agency withheld authorization as to 339 items. Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc., Marchetti, and Marks filed suit to have the deletions
restored. The plaintiffs contended that the items deleted by the CIA
were not in fact classified, claimed that some of the items were in the
public domain, and preserved their First Amendment claim by assert-
ing that the information would not cause immediate and irreparable
damage to national security.3 5 Before the case came on for hearing,
30. Id. at 1317.
31. Id. at 1318.
32. Id. (Craven, J., concurring).
33. Id.
34. The planned Esquire article has apparently never been published.
35. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 12-13, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509
F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975).
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the CIA made several releases of previously unauthorized items, so that
only 168 items remained deleted.36
1. The District Court
At the hearing on Marchetti's suit to have the deleted material
returned, four deputy directors of the CIA testified that they had read
the manuscript and had noted parts that they felt revealed classified
information. Other staff members then researched those items, and
found classified documents that contained the information included in
the manuscript. Thus the deputy directors determined that the 168
items were indeed related to classified documents, although they were
unable to say when these documents were classified or by whom.37
The court again summarily rejected the plaintiffs' challenge to the rea-
sonableness of the classification. 8
Because none of the deputy directors had personally classified the
information, and because they did not know when the information had
been classified, District Judge Bryan determined that this method of
reviewing and assessing the contents of the manuscript was too impre-
cise-in effect, it would be an ad hoc classification of that material by
those deputy directors. 39 The court of appeals had held in Marchetti
that the employee secrecy agreement applied only to classified informa-
tion obtained by Marchetti during the term of his employment. District
Judge Bryan therefore concluded that the CIA had not shown that the
materials had been classified during Marchetti's employment, and the
agreement, therefore, was not necessarily applicable.4"
Later in the hearing, the CIA produced certain documents with
classifications stamped upon them.41  These documents had been re-
produced with all but the relevant portions blocked out, often with only
a paragraph or a sentence remaining. Because large parts of the docu-
36. The court stated that the first release was of 114 items, the second of 29 items,
and the third of 57 items, totaling 200 items released. The court stated, however, that
the total number of unreleased items was 168. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d
1362, 1365 (4th Cir. 1975). Subtracting the 168 contested items from the 339 items
originally deleted leaves 171 items released, not 200, as the addition of the stated num-
ber of releases would indicate.
37. Id. at 1365-66.
38. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 14, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d
1362 (4th Cir. 1975).
39. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (4th Cir. 1975).
40. Id. at 1366.
41. The decision of the court of appeals states that most of the classifications were
'Top Secret." Id. at 1366. Counsel for the plaintiffs claimed that only 22 of the
government's 103 exhibits were marked "Top Secret" while most were "Secret" and some
were "Confidential." Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 20, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v.
Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975).
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ments were blocked out, the court held that there had been no showing
that the material remaining on the documents was the cause of the
document's classifications.4 2  Therefore, the court held that the CIA's
extracted materials met the Marchetti standard for only 26 of the 168
items.43 As to the remaining items, District Judge Bryan acknowl-
edged that the deputy directors' testimony indicated that the material
was "sensitive." Nevertheless, he held that this determination was in-
sufficient because the CIA had not shown that the information sought
to be withheld was actually the information which had caused the docu-
ment to be classified.
Both sides appealed the decision-Knopf to obtain release of the
remaining 26 items, the CIA to restore the 142 items released by the
district court. When Judge Bryan stayed execution of his judgment
pending appeal, Knopf decided to publish the book leaving out all 168
disputed items.
44
2. The Court of Appeals
Chief Circuit Judge Haynsworth again wrote the opinion for the
Fourth Circuit. The court stated that the Marchetti opinion must have
misled the district court into imposing an unreasonable burden on the
CIA of proving proper classification. 45 The court first noted that after
Marchetti was decided an amendment to the Freedom of Information
Act4" was enacted imposing a stricter standard for the withholding of
information. The act itself provided for disclosure of certain previously
protected information. The amendment, however, specifically ex-
empted from disclosure nine types of information, including matters
that are "specifically authorized under criteria established by an
Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such
Executive order. '47  In addition, the amendment provides for in
camera review of the materials in the judge's discretion to determine
whether they fall within the exemption. The agency has the burden
of showing that the materials indeed fall within the exemption. 48
42. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1366 (4th Cir. 1975).
43. Id. The judge's belief that concrete proof of classification was necessary arose
partly from the testimony of Dr. Halperin. MARCHErI AND MARKS, supra note 4, at
xxvi.
44. MARCHETn AND MARKS, supra note 4, at xxvi.
45. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1367 (4th Cir. 1975).
46. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552a (Supp. V, 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (A) (Supp. V, 1975).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (Supp. V, 1975). This provision was drafted to
negate the decision in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1972),
which held that executive decisions respecting the classifying of information are not
subject to judicial review.
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As a result of the new legislation, unless the agency can show that
the material was properly classified under an executive order, it must
be released under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.
Consequently the court found that any material obtainable under the
Freedom of Information Act could no longer come under the provisions
of the secrecy agreement because that information could so easily be-
come a part of the public domain.49 Therefore, the CIA would have
to prove that the materials were classifiable and properly classified un-
der an executive order.
The court also recognized that Congress has provided that the di-
rector of the CIA should protect secret information,50 and that Execu-
tive Order No. 1165251 established a classification system that the CIA
used to protect sensitive information.52 The court noted that it had
examined some of the 142 deletions, and, since some of the deletions
related to intelligence information vital to national security, such mat-
ters would "seem clearly to be classifiable under the authorization of
the Executive Order. . . ."5 Consequently, because the CIA's clas-
sification system was properly established pursuant to Executive Order
No. 11652, materials classified thereunder would be exempt from dis-
closure.
Then, turning to the question of whether the information was
properly classified, Chief Judge Haynsworth stated:
There is a presumption of regularity in the performance by
a public official of his public duty. "The presumption of regularity
supports the official acts of public officers, and, in the absence of
clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have prop-
erly discharged their official duties." That presumption leaves no
room for speculation that information which the district court can
recognize as proper for top secret classification was not classified
at all by the official who placed the "Top Secret" legend on the
document. This is so whether or not the document contains or may
contain other information which should have been classified in the
same degree. Under the prevailing practice of classifying a docu-
ment in accordance with the most sensitive information it contains,
the presumption, in the absence of affirmative proof to the con-
trary, requires the conclusion that all information within it, re-
quired by the Executive Order to be classified, was classified when
the legend was affixed to the document, even though the particular
bit of relevant information, alone, may be properly classified only
in a lower degree than the document's classification. In short, the
government was required to show no more than that each deletion
item disclosed information which was required to be classified in
49. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1367 (4th Cir. 1975).
50. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d) (3) (1970).
51. 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1974).
52. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1367-68 (4th Cir. 1975).
53. Id. at 1368.
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any degree and which was contained in a document bearing a
classification stamp.
54
As a result of this presumption the CIA's presentation of the classified
documents was sufficient proof that all the classifiable material therein
was "properly classified" despite the blocked out areas, even though
the specific item in question would be properly classified only in a
lower classification. Furthermore, the presumption also was sufficient
to justify an assumption that these documents were classified at the
time of the operation. Thus the CIA did not have to meet the burden
of proving that the documents were classified prior to the time Mar-
chetti left the agency.55
The court stated that it was not necessary for the CIA to disclose
the full contents of the documents because of the risk involved, adding
that courts are ill-equipped to provide the security necessary for highly
sensitive material. 56  The court also noted that the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act states that an in camera inspection is to be at the judge's
discretion, so that testimony or affidavits could replace the inspection.
57
The court concluded that all that need be shown is that the material
was classifiable and was in a classified document.58  Furthermore, the
court stated that Marchetti's claim that the government had to show
immediate and irreparable damage was irrelevant to the present in-
junction because Marchetti "effectively relinquished his First Amend-
ment rights" by signing the secrecy agreement. 59
Finally, the court turned to the issue of whether the CIA could
withhold authorization for items that had been reported in other articles
but had not been publicly disclosed or confirmed by the CIA. The
court found the withholding of authorization proper in such situations
because such information was not properly part of the public domain
due to its speculative nature. To permit comment on that which ex-
isted only as speculation might give credence to a report that would
otherwise be dismissed as a rumor. A second reason noted by the
court was that when Marks was asked whether he was the source of
information of the other reports he declined to answer on Fifth Amend-
ment grounds,60 thus presenting the possibility that Marks was the
source of the leaks.
54. Id. (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 1369.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. The court recognized that Executive Order No. 11652 established the National
Security Council as a monitor of that order's classification system. The order also
established an interagency review committee to make decisions about declassification.
The court suggested that this administrative remedy would be far more effective than
judicial review of the propriety of classifications and declassifications. Id. at 1369-70.
59. Id. at 1370.
60. Id.
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Having determined that the lower court placed too great a burden
on the CIA by requiring it to show that the material it sought to delete
had been classified without properly acknowledging the blocked out
documents, the court of appeals reversed the holding of the lower court
to the extent that it had released part of the deleted material. The
Supreme Court denied Knopf's petition for certiorari. °1
H. The Contract
With the sweep of a rubber stamp labeled "top secret" the
executive department seeks to abridge the freedom of the press. It
has offered no more. We are asked to turn our backs on the First
Amendment simply because certain officials have labeled material
as unfit for the American people and the people of the world.
Surely we must demand more. To allow a government to suppress
free speech simply through a system of bureaucratic classification
would sell our heritage far, far too cheaply. 2
With these words, Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright dissented from the
decision that upheld a district court's injunction against further publica-
tion of the Pentagon Papers. At first, Judge Wright's words seem ap-
plicable to the Marchetti case, but in Marchetti the government did
offer more-the secrecy agreement. Because of this agreement, the
court of appeals upheld the injunction without applying either the
standard of "direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our Nation
or its people,"6 as the Court required in New York Times, or the stand-
ard of "injury to the United States" found in criminal statutes. 64
The contract, as interpreted by the court of appeals, had four
major provisions: (1) it required Marchetti to submit the manuscript
to the CIA for authorization; (2) it allowed the CIA to withhold au-
thorization for information contained in classified documents; (3) it
forced Marchetti to seek judicial review of CIA determinations to with-
hold authorization; and (4) it permitted review only to the extent of
compelling the CIA to present classified documents containing refer-
ences to the information in question. Absent the agreement, it seems
unlikely that the CIA could have compelled Marchetti to comply with
any of these procedures. 65
61. 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
62. United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322, 1326 (D.C. Cir.)
(Wright, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971).
63. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
64. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1970).
65. But see United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1316 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972), wherein the court states that had there been no contract,
the court might have implied such a contract.
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The basic provisions of the contract seem unassailable-particu-
larly the requirement that Marchetti submit his manuscript to the CIA
for authorization. However, by interpreting the contract to allow the
withholding of authorization for all information relating to classified
documents, thereby limiting the extent of judicial review of the re-
straint, the court's ruling arguably is an overbroad restriction of the
First Amendment rights of the agent-author.
The court in Marchetti de-emphasized the First Amendment pro-
tections arising from New York Times by stressing the secrecy agree-
ment, finding it a reasonable restriction. This conclusion appears to
have been reached without an examination of cases which set the
standards for reasonableness of government employment contracts re-
stricting First Amendment rights. The court also implicitly analogizes
to private employment contracts, without recognizing the significant
differences between private and government employment contracts.
A. Government v. Private Employment Contracts
In Marchetti Judge Bryan asserted and Chief Judge Haynsworth
implied that the enforcement of this contract is similar to the enforce-
ment of any other employer-employee contract.66 However, several
features actually distinguish government employment contracts from
private contracts. First, although the government may limit the speech
of its employees more by contract than it could merely by the im-
position of criminal sanctions on non-employees, government contracts
are nevertheless subject to First Amendment limitations, as the court
noted in Marchetti.6 7 Second, while private employers cannot make
unauthorized disclosures a criminal offense, the government can legis-
late by means of criminal sanctions to protect against disclosure of cer-
tain types of information. Thus the government's remedies of both ter-
mination of employment and initiation of a criminal proceeding are a
stronger deterrent than the private employer's mere right to terminate
employment.
Third, the public has a greater right and need to know about the
workings of the government than about the working of private enter-
prise. The CIA, for example, often serves as an unofficial 'ambassa-
dor' of the United States in foreign countries, implementing policies of
the executive that are or should be subject to public scrutiny. The
public must have the opportunity to scrutinize decisions, policies and
mistakes of government representatives in order to evaluate the gov-
ernment's efficiency, provided there will be no resulting danger to na-
tional security.
66. See id. at 1311. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
67. 466 F.2d at 1313.
1085Fall 19761
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Thus it would appear that the employment contract is more essen-
tial to the private employer, because it is his only remedy for disclosure
of secret information, whereas the government has generally chosen to
rely on its criminal sanctions to prevent disclosures. Furthermore, pro-
tection of public comment on government policy is a major goal of the
First Amendment. Consequently, because of the First Amendment,
government contracts may not be as broad in scope as private contracts,
as the following discussion will demonstrate.
B. Government Employment Contracts
1. The Standard
Historically, there were few restrictions on the government's right
to contractually limit its employees' First Amendment rights. The old
approach was indicated by Justice Holmes when he was a member of
the Massachusetts Supreme Court: "The petitioner may have a con-
stitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be
a policeman."68 However, in 1952, speaking of a New York statute
which prohibited the hiring of teachers who advocated the overthrow
of the government, the Supreme Court indicated the evolving standard:
It is clear that such persons have the right under our law to
assemble, speak, think and believe as they will. It is equally clear
that they have no right to work for the state in the school system
on their own terms. They may work for the school system upon
reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities of New York.
If they do not choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty
to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere. Has the
State thus deprived them of any right to free speech or assembly?
We think not. 69
The reasonableness test thus enunciated by implication limited
the government's contractual powers. The test was applied in United
Public Workers v. Mitchell,70 wherein a federal employee faced dis-
missal for violation of the Hatch Act,71 which made it unlawful for
68. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
Justice Holmes' statement is an example of what came to be known as the right-privilege
doctrine, which provided that while citizens could constitutionally assert their right to
free speech, government employment was a privilege that the government could deny
when that citizen's speech was offensive. Subsequent cases indicate that the right-
privilege doctrine is no longer applicable: "Mhis Court now has rejected the concept
that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a
'right' or as a 'privilege.'" Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). See
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
69. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492-93 (1952) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
70. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 61(h) (1946), asamended, 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1970).
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federal employees to actively participate in political campaigns. Not-
ing that it was Congress' purpose to "promote efficiency and integrity
in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in
the public service, 172 the Court stated that the Hatch Act was justifiable
because "an actively partisan governmental personnel threatens good
administration. . . .-7 The Court concluded: "For regulation of em-
ployees it is not necessary that the act regulated be anything more than
an act reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency
of the public service. '7 4  Thus the standard today is that the govern-
ment may contractually condition government employment upon the
surrender of constitutional rights only when the surrender is reasonable
in the protection of an important governmental interest.
75
2. The Standard Applied
In Pickering v. Board of Education76 the Court noted the delicate
nature of the standard to be applied:
[T]he theory that employment which may be denied altogether
may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreason-
able, has been uniformly rejected. At the same time it cannot be
gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating
the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citi-
zenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees. 77
72. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96-97 (1947). In 1973 the
Court stated: "We unhesitantly reaffirm the Mitchell holding that Congress had, and
has, the power to prevent Mr. Poole and others like him from holding a party office,
working at the polls, and acting as party paymaster for other party workers." Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973).
73. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 98 (1947).
74. Id. at 101.
75. Language in Letter Carriers indicates that the reasonableness test remains in
effect. The Court stated: "[A]s the Court held in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968), the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and 'the
speech of its employees that differ[s] significantly from those it possesses in connection
with regulation of.the speech of the citizenry in general.' The problem in any case is to
arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the [government], as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Civil
Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 564
(1973). See also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE
CONsTrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION,
Doe. No. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 970-89 (1973).
76. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
77. Id. at 568 (citations omitted).
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Pickering, a teacher, was dismissed for writing a letter critical of
the local school board. The school board found the letter "detrimental
to the efficient operation and administration of the schools of the dis-
trict.17 8  However, the Court noted that Pickering's comments related
to "matters of public concern." Since there was no evidence about the
effect of his letter, permitting Pickering's dismissal because "the inter-
ests of the schools require" was found to be a violation of his First
Amendment rights because the efficiency of the school system was not
shown to have been impaired. 79
Furthermore, in Wieman v. Updegraff,80 the Court struck down
a loyalty oath which required all state employees to attest that they
were not presently, nor had they been for the previous five years, a
member of any organization "which has been officially determined by
the Attorney General . . . to be a communist front or subversive or-
ganization." 8' The Court found that the employee's membership may
have been innocent, or the group may not have been subversive at the
time of his membership. Consequently this statute violated due proc-
ess by excluding citizens from public service based on an arbitrary
classification of the organization.
8 2
In Shelton v. Tucker8 an Arkansas statute which compelled a
teacher to file an affidavit listing those organizations to which he be-
longed within the past five years violated the teacher's right of freedom
of association because it went "far beyond what might be justified in
the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry .. ."4 The Court noted
that the teacher "serves at the absolute will of those to whom the dis-
closure must be made," because there were no charges made, no notice
given, no hearing held and no opportunity to explain permitted.8 5 The
statute was therefore held to be overbroad because it required dis-
closure of all associations, including churches and political parties,
thereby stifling fundamental liberty."
When the Court held that criminal statutes could prohibit only
knowing and active membership in a communist organization, 7 this re-
quirement carried over into employment contracts. In Elfbrandt v.
Russells" an Arizona statute that required an oath that the employee
78. Id. at 574.
79. Id. at 573-74.
80. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
81. Id. at 186.
82. Id. at 190-91.
83. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
84. Id. at 490.
85. Id. at 486.
86. Id. at 488.
87. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
88. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
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was not a member of the communist party made it a felony to sign the
oath if the signer was a member of an organization and knew of its
purpose to overthrow the government.8 9 This statute was held to be
overbroad because it prohibited membership in any organization that
had as one of its purposes the overthrow of the government, without
requiring a showing of specific intent to overthrow the government.90
Finally, in United States v. Robel9' the Court struck down the provision
of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 195092 which made it a
crime for members of the communist party to hold positions in defense
facilities. The Court noted that the statute forced a prospective em-
ployee to choose between the right to hold a job and the right of free
association.9 3 Consequently the Court held that the statute was over-
broad since it was not limited to active members; there was no proof
that the individual's membership posed any threat to a governmental
interest.94
C. Summary
The above cases deal with contracts limiting a First Amendment
right which arises at various stages in the course of employment. The
standard of reasonableness applies whether the case involves a general
prohibition of employment of a certain group of people,98 an oath dur-
ing employment which is required in order for the employment to con-
tinue,98 or a termination.9 7 Thus the standard of reasonableness will
be applied whenever the government seeks to protect an interest by
conditioning employment on the surrender of a First Amendment
right.98 In all these cases the government sought to protect either its
continued existence or its efficiency.99 In determining the reasonable-
ness of the employment contracts by balancing the government's inter-
est against the First Amendment freedoms of speech and association,
the Court considered the extent to which the government's interests
were threatened. The balancing process therefore took into considera-
tion the gravity and imminence of the danger to government security
89. Id. at 12-13.
90. Id. at 17.
91. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
92. 64 Stat. 992, 50 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1) (D) (1950).
93. 389 U.S. at 264-65.
94. Id. at 265-66.
95. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
96. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 US. 183 (1952).
97. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
98. See note 75 supra.
99. See Note, Government Information Leaks and the First Amendment, 64 CALnF.
L. REV. 108, 111-12 (1976).
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or the extent of the impairment of the efficiency of the governmental
agency.
100
In the loyalty oath cases-where governmental interests in both
security and efficiency were involved-the states' statutes were held
to be overbroad because government employment would be lost for any
form of membership in the Communist party, without requiring that that
membership be an active membership manifesting "specific intent to
further the illegal aims of the [Communist Party]."'' In other words,
these cases indicate that the Court will not uphold as reasonable a con-
tract which curtails a First Amendment freedom absent a showing of
a harmful effect from a government employee's exercise of that free-
dom. In analyzing the Marchetti contract under this standard, the
question then becomes whether a sufficiently harmful effect was shown
so that it would be reasonable to condition employment on the signing
of a contract prohibiting the disclosure of any material relating to a clas-
sified document.
In Marchetti the court stated that the contract was reasonable
"[s]ince information highly sensitive to the conduct of foreign affairs
and the national defense was involved . *. .. "2 However, in the
loyalty oath cases membership in subversive organizations would seem
to present a prima facie case of potential danger to the government
or the efficiency of its agencies-particularly as in Robel where the
party member worked in a defense plant-just as disclosure of clas-
sified documents would seem to present a prima facie case of potential
danger to national security. Yet in these cases the Court held that the
prima facie presentations of danger were not a sufficient showing of
a danger, the gravity and imminence of which would be sufficient
enough to require a restriction of the employee's First Amendment
rights; rather there must be a more definite showing of a danger of
sufficient gravity and imminence-knowingly being an active member
in an organization whose intent is to overthrow the government. 03
Similarly, it would seem that in order for the CIA to withhold authoriza-
tion of manuscripts, there should be a more definite showing of danger
to national security of sufficient gravity and imminence than the prima
facie potential danger from disclosure of classified documents.
100. For example, Pickering suggested that termination of employment might be
permissible where it was shown that the employee's speech reduced the efficiency of the
agency, but the Court found that Pickering's letter did not have that result. 391 U.S. at
572-73.
101. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 607 (1967), citing Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966). See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1967);
Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
102. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1316 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972).
103. See notes 87-94 and accompanying text supra.
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Although New York Times Co. v. United States'0 4 did not involve
an employment contract, it is still relevant to this question of whether
the mere disclosure of classified information is a danger of sufficient
gravity and imminence as to permit a curtailment of a First Amendment
right. In New York Times a plurality of the Court felt that there must
be a showing of direct, immediate and irreparable damage in order to
restrain speech; 10 5 a mere showing that a document was classified
would not be sufficient when balanced against the First Amendment.
A similar conclusion emerges from the criminal cases involving prose-
cutions for disclosure of classified material-the government must
prove that disclosure resulted in damage to national security, and is not
allowed to merely show that a classified document was disclosed.'0 6
In conclusion, while there appear to be no Supreme Court cases
directly involving the government contracting to protect its classified in-
formation, several cases point toward the requirement of actual damage
to national security before fundamental rights can be curtailed. Thus
interpreting the contract so as to prohibit publication of all classified
materials did not force the government to prove a nexus between
revelation of all classified material and damage to national security.
Because damage to national security is the interest involved herein,
interpreting Marchetti's contract so as not to require this proof of dam-
age may allow the contract to be overbroad, since some revelations will
not necessarily be damaging-for example those which discuss abuses
of power, those which reveal embarassing information, and, to a large
extent, those which discuss past operations.
11I. First Amendment Standards
A. Introduction: Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment
In Marchetti the court noted that "[o]ne may speculate that or-
dinary criminal sanctions might suffice to prevent unauthorized dis-
closure.' 0 7 When there is a criminal penalty for a certain type of
speech, the threat of the subsequent punishment will often deter bor-
derline speech that may in actuality be protected by the First Amend-
ment. It is precisely for this reason that the Supreme Court has been
so exacting when deciding whether a criminal statute affecting speech
is overbroad. Congress cannot, by calling a certain class of speech
criminal, automatically eliminate First Amendment considerations. The
Courfs problem in formulating its First Amendment standards has
104. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See notes 116-34 and accompanying text infra.
105. See 403 U.S. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., con-
curring).
106. See notes 142-56 and accompanying text infra.
107. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1975).
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been in determining what level of danger is necessary for speech to
be criminal. In 1919 the Court adopted the "clear and present danger"
test'018 advocated by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, and this test was
applied and modified for the next half-century. In 1969 the Court
held that speech may not be punished if it is mere advocacy of eventual
criminal action; rather there must be an "incitement to imminent law-
less action." 09 As noted in the previous section, whichever test the
Court applied, in order to punish speech, the government was required
to show an impending danger-a substantive evil-which the speech
sought to promote. The requirement of impending danger was present
in every test; the variations among the tests involved only the quantum
or immediacy of the danger. 110
Because prior restraints impose a greater danger to freedom of
speech than subsequent punishment, there has always been a reluc-
tance to establish such systems."' As late as 1967, absolute state-
ments against prior restraints still appeared, such as the statement from
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts: "[W]e have rejected all manner of
prior restraint on publication, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, despite
strong arguments that if the material was unprotected the time of sup-
pression was immaterial."" 2
In citing Near, Justice Harlan was probably referring to Chief Jus-
tice Hughes' comment that "it has been generally . . . considered that
it is the chief purpose of [the First Amendment] to prevent previous
restraints upon publication.""13 Actually, however, Near is much more
often cited as being the first statement by the Court (in dicta) authoriz-
ing prior restraints, and then "only in exceptional cases."'"14 Near's ex-
amples of such permissible restraints are restraint of publication of sail-
ing dates and troop locations in times of war, or of obscenity. 1 5 Thus
the exceptional cases in which prior restraint is permissible require a
showing of a greater quantum of danger or a substantial evil of greater
imminence than for a criminal prosecution.
108. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
109. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
110. "What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working
principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before utterances can be punished." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
262 (1941).
111. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 656-
57 (1955).
112. 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1967). See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARES *151, 152.
113. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
114. Id. at 716.
115. Id.
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B. New York Times Co. v. United States
In New York Times Co. v. United States 16 the Supreme Court
restated its historical disapproval of prior restraint of speech and the
press: "Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."'11 7 The
case arose when The New York Times and The Washington Post began
publishing portions of the "History of United States Decision-Making
Process on Viet Nam Policy," known as the Pentagon Papers. Con-
cerned that portions of this document-which has been classified "Top
Secret"-would reveal sensitive national security information, the gov-
ernment sought an injunction restraining further publication. The
Court held that the government had not sustained its burden of demon-
strating the necessity of further restraint of publication.
The concurring justices cited two main reasons for refusing to
grant the injunction. The first was the theory of separation of power-
establishing the authority and the standards under which the press may
be restrained from publishing sensitive material is a legislative duty." S
Because Congress had not enacted such provisions for the restraint of
the press-Justices Douglas and Marshall noted that Congress had
specifically chosen not to adopt such measures 9-the executive
branch should not be permitted to persuade the Court to judicially im-
pose such a system of restraint.' 20  The second reason was that the gov-
ernment sought the injunction on the claim that revelation of the infor-
mation would cause "direct, immediate and irreparable damage to
[the security of the United States],' '1 21 but no proof of such imminent
harm was advanced by the government. Thus "direct, immediate and
irreparable damage to [the security of the United States]" was ac-
116. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
117. Id. at 714.
118. Id. at 742.
119. Justice Douglas analyzed the relevant sections of the Espionage Act, examples
of which can be found in note 144 infra. He observed that three of the eight espionage
sections contained the word "publish," that the rejected version of section 793 (e) of Title
18 of the United States Code had contained a sanction for publication, but the section
enacted did not. Furthermore, he cited section 793. In section 1(b) it states: "Nothing
in this Act shall be construed to authorize, require or establish military or civilian
censorship or in any way to limit or infringe upon freedom of the press or of speech as
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and no regulation shall be promul-
gated hereunder having that effect." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 720-21 (1972) (Douglas, I., concurring). See also id. at 747 (Marshall, J.,
concurring); 103 CoNG. Rzc. 10447-50.
120. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718 (Black, J., concur-
ring); id. at 723 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 740 (White, J., concurring); id. at 740-
41 (Marshall, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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cepted by several of the justices as the standard for those exceptionally
dangerous substantive evils which permits a prior restraint. However
those justices concluded that the government had not sustained its bur-
den of proving that such damage would result from disclosure of the
Pentagon Papers.
The critical votes in the case were those of Justices Stewart and
White, the "swing men," who really adopted both arguments of the ma-
jority. Each joined the other's concurrence. Justice Stewart conceded
that the Constitution gives the executive power over foreign affairs in-
cluding the protection of secret operations. However, both Congress
and the courts have a role to play in the system's checks and balances-
Congress in imposing criminal sanctions, and the courts in determining
the applicability of those criminal sanctions.122 Justice Stewart was also
concerned that secrecy not become overly extensive or manipulable.
After noting that some of the material in the Pentagon Papers would
in fact be harmful, he concluded that he must join the majority because
"I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely result in direct,
immediate and irreparable damage to our Nation and its people.' 12
Justice White began his opinion by stating, "I concur in today's
judgments, but only because of the concededly extraordinary protection
against prior restraints enjoyed by the press under our constitutional
system."'12  He also stated that he felt that some harm might result
from further publication. But, because Congress has been satisfied to
rely on criminal sanctions, Justice White refused to allow further re-
straint. 125  Justice White stated that not even the "grave and irrepar-
able damage" standard should be applied, because this standard would
be difficult to apply, and by implementing it, the Court would be mak-
ing a fatal first step toward judicially-imposed restraints of the press.' 26
Consequently, Justice White would have required the government to
rely on its criminal sanctions.
Justice Harlan wrote the only dissenting opinion which addressed
the issues of the case. 2 7  Finding that "the scope of the judicial func-
tion in passing upon the activities of the Executive Branch. . .is very
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 730-3 1 (White, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 740.
126. Id. at 732-33.
127. Justice Harlan was also concerned with the rapidity with which the case was
decided. Since the Pentagon Papers comprised forty-seven volumes, government officials
could not review them all in the short period of time allowed. Furthermore, the Court
decided the case six days after the petition for certiorari was filed, causing Justice Harlan
to comment: "With all respect, I consider that the Court has been almost irresponsibly
feverish in dealing with these cases." Id. at 753 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Justice
Harlan's chronology of the case, id,
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narrowly restricted,"'128  Justice Harlan rejected the separation of
powers argument propounded by the majority. To him, the executive
branch's power to act in foreign affairs should extend to the ability to
enforce its classification system.12 9 Chief Justice Burger joined in Jus-
tice Harlan's opinion, although the Chief Justice seemed more con-
cerned with the haste with which the case was decided. 130  Interest-
ingly, the next to the last paragraph of the Chief Justice's opinion
stated: "I should add that I am in general agreement with much of
what Mr. Justice White has expressed with respect to penal sanctions
concerning communication or retention of documents or information
relating to the national defense." " ' Similarly, Justice Blackmun said
that he was "in substantial accord" with that part of Justice White's
opinion.
132
New York Times seems as important to Marchetti and Knopf for
what it did not say, as for what it did say. First, the Court warned
that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this court
bearing a heavy burden against its constitutional validity."' 33 Thus the
First Amendment requires that the CIA must show that the secrecy
agreement was properly drafted to protect against a substantive evil.
The implicit holding of New York Times was that simply showing that
the material revealed was classified did not suffice as a showing of an
imminent substantive evil, particularly because even material which is
properly classified will be desensitized with the passage of time.
Second, the legislative branch has not authorized any form of prior re-
straints, including employment contracts, for the protection of classified
documents. Therefore, arguably, absent congressional authorization,
the contract's enforceability must hinge upon its usefulness in imple-
128. Id. at 756.
129. Id. at 757. The checks and balances argument rejected by Harlan was an
important consideration for the Senate committee investigating the need for a permanent
committee to oversee United States intelligence activities. See Hearings on S. 317
Before the Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-12 (1976)
(opening statements of the Senators). An argument in opposition to Justice Harlan's
position is that because ours is a system of laws and of checks and balances, insofar as
Congress has not provided a check on the executive intelligence agencies, where there is
an allegation that laws are being violated by the executive branch, the courts have a duty
to provide a check on the executive's actions.
130. See note 127 supra. Chief Justice Burger was particularly perturbed that the
New York Times studied the documents for three or four months, and then expected the
government to review them in a few weeks. 403 U.S. at 750 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
To Chief Justice Burger, the Times was setting itself up as the sole trustee of the public's
"right to know." Id. at 749. Consequently, because of the undue haste with which the
case proceeded, he would have remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings. Id. at 752.
131. Id. at 759.
132. Id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 714 (emphasis added).
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menting and enforcing the minimum standard set by New York Times
for the showing of a substantive evil of sufficient danger to justify a
prior restraint, direct and immediate danger to the security of the
United States.
Third, in New York Times the Court ignored the argument for
the operation of the presumption that an official has properly per-
formed his duties. This presumption was a cornerstone of the holding
in Knopf limiting judicial review. In New York Times judicial review
was implicitly approved by the concurring justices, and also by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, who argued that the Court should
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. Further-
more, Justice Harlan's argument for limited judicial review was based
not on the presumption of proper performance of his duties by a gov-
ernment official, but on his deference to the executive branch in for-
eign affairs.
Fourth, Justice White's argument that the Court should force the
executive branch to rely on its criminal sanctions is important. He in-
dicates that a prior restraint would never be available when there exists
an appropriate criminal sanction. This argument is significant because
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun appear to agree.
Thus, except for the secrecy agreement in Marchetti, Marchetti
and New York Times are extremely similar. Both involved a prior re-
straint of speech which had no congressional approval. There was an
existing criminal sanction'"4 under which Marchetti could have been
prosecuted, just as there was in New York Times. Yet in New York
Times the prior restraint was not permitted, whereas in Marchetti, au-
thorization of nearly twenty per cent of the book was withheld by the
CIA. One major distinction is that in Knopf, the court allowed the
presumption that an official properly performs his duties and with that
presumption precluded judicial review of the classified material. In
New York Times, the presumption might have been applied, but was
not. Rather, there was a full judicial review, and the government could
not meet the standard set for the quantum of danger necessary to be
proven before a prior restraint will be permitted.
C. The Role of the Judiciary
1. The First Amendment Cases
Historically the Supreme Court has dictated an active role for the
judiciary in protecting First Amendment rights. The courts apply
several tests to determine whether a statute or ordinance violates the
First Amendment. Safeguarding the fundamental rights of speech and
134. See note 144 infra.
1096 HIASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 8
press also requires the courts to scrutinize the ideas being expressed
in order to determine whether the speech may be punished or re-
strained. When the government asserts that a governmental interest
has or will be harmed by speech, the courts will require that the harm
be proven before the speech will be restrained or punished.
The "clear and present danger" cases'3 5 illustrate the principle
that the courts will examine the speech of the defendant in order to
determine whether that speech presents a sufficiently dangerous ex-
pression of ideas as to justify punishing him for stating those ideas.
Similarly, in Pickering v. Board of Education,136 the Court examined
the letter written by a teacher and concluded that the letter would not
undermine the efficiency of the school system, which was the interst
the government sought to protect. In a case involving picketing the
Supreme Court summarized the procedure for lower courts to follow:
"It is imperative that, when the effective exercise of these rights is
claimed to be abridged, the courts should 'weigh the circumstances' and
'appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced' in support of the
challenged regulations."'1
7
When a prior restraint of speech or press is involved, the courts
are to scrutinize both the restraining process and the material re-
strained. The obscenity cases have provided an extensive forum for
the Supreme Court to develop standards under which a prior restraint
may be imposed. Because obscenity is not constitutionally protected
speech,"" the essential determination is whether the material is ob-
scene; if so, it may be restrained. However, to safeguard against the
restraint of constitutionally protected speech, the Court has established
strict standards scrutinizing the processes under which material is
deemed obscene.
In Freedman v. Maryland'3 9 the Court stated its standards for the
prior restraint of films. 140  Essential to this restraint was full judicial
135. See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
136. 39,1 U.S. 563 (1968).
137. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96 (1940), quoting from Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 161, 162 (1939).
138. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
139. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
140. "First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest
on the censor. As we said in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 'Where the
transcendent value of speech is involved, due process certainly requires . . . that the
State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants engaged in criminal
speech.' Second, while the State may require advance submission. . . the requirement
cannot be administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censor's
determination whether a film constitutes protected expression. The teaching of our cases
is that, because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the
necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial
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review, to discover whether constitutionally protected speech was being
restrained. The Court stated its primary reason for stressing independ-
ent judicial review:
Unlike a prosecution for obscenity, a censorship proceeding puts
the initial burden on the exhibitor or distributor. Because the cen-
sor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may
well be less responsive than a court. to the constitutionally pro-
tected interests in free expression.
14 1
Many of the above principles can be seen in New York Times.
Since it involved a prior restraint, judicial, review was automatically re-
quired. The government had the burden of proving harm to its inter-
est, national security. Each of the justices indicated that he did in fact
examine the Pentagon Papers to determine if the manuscript presented
a danger to national security. It is clear that the result would not have
been the same had the government been able to prove a certain quan-
tum of potential danger to national security; the critical point is that
the government had the burden of proof and it was not met.
2. Injury to National Security
The main purpose of the presidential system of classification of
documents is the protection of national security by protecting infor-
mation, the revelation of which would cause damage to national secu-
rity. Executive Order No. 11652142 revised the classification system
to focus on the quantum of damage necessary for each classification.
Thus the requirement of "exceptionally grave danger to the national
security" was established for the "Top Secret" classification, "serious
damage to the national security" for "Secret" and "damage to the na-
tional security" for "Confidential."' 43
According to Executive Order No. 11652, then, in order for any
information to be classified, there would have to be, at the least, a find-
ing of "damage to the national security." Since the present criminal
codes' set "injury to the United States or (use) to the advantage of
determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint .... [Third], the procedure
must also assure a prompt final judicial decision." Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,
58-59 (1965). See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-62
(1975).
141. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S 51, 57-58 (1965).
142. 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1974).
143. Id. at § 340.
144. Section 793(e) of Title 18 is the statute involved in these cases, and was most
often cited in New York Times Co. v. United States: "Whoever having unauthorized
possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing . . . or information
relating to the national defense, which information the possessor has reason to believe
could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, willfully communicates... the same to any person not entitled to receive it...
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any foreign nation" as the standard for punishment for the disclosure
of classified information, the argument continues to be advanced that
divulging any classified information must necessarily fall within the
criminal standard. 145 The few criminal cases involving prosecutions for
the disclosure of damaging information appear completely contrary to
the above rationale. These cases indicate that it is not sufficient to
show that a classified document has been disclosed; rather the jury must
determine that the disclosure would cause injury to the national security
or could be used to the benefit of any foreign nation.
The first case, Gorin v. United States'46 came before the creation
of the present classification system.' 47  The defendant contended that
his particular act-obtaining information on the activities of the Jap-
anese-could not properly be held to be injurious to the United States
or beneficial to a foreign nation. He claimed further that the issue of
harm to national security was a question of law. The Supreme Court
held that the trial court had properly regarded the issue of harm as a
question of fact for the jury, thus approving the judge's instruction to
the jury that "[wlhether or not the information, obtained by any de-
fendant in this case, concerned, regarded or was connected with the
national defense is a question of fact solely for the determination of
this jury.'
48
The creation of the classification system did not lead to a pre-
sumption that revelation of classified documents automatically estab-
lishes the requisite showing of harm to national security. To the con-
[s]hall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1970). Contrast this with section 798(a) of Title 18: "Whoever
knowingly and willfully communicates. . . or publishes or uses in any manner prejudi-
cial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign
government. .. any classified information. . . concerning the communication intelli-
gence activities of the United States or any foreign government; or obtained by the
process of communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign govern-
ment, knowing the same to have been obtained by such process [s]hall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 798(a)
(1970).
145. See S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1124 (1975), which reads: "A person is guilty
of an offense, if, being or having been in authorized possession or control of classified
information, or having obtained such information as a result of his being or having been
a federal public servant, he communicates such information to a person who is not
authorized to receive it."
146. 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
147. Gorin was prosecuted under the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, 50 U.S.C. §§
31, 32, 34, 36, repealed and reenacted, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-99 (1970), which made it a
crime to enter certain areas to obtain national defense information, and also to copy or
photograph that information. The act required "intent or reason to believe that the
information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of any foreign nation."
148. Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 31 (1941).
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trary, the exact instruction given in Gorin-this time in reference to
a prosecution under section 793 of Title 18 of the United States
Code149 -was approved twenty-one years later by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Soblen.150 In Soblen there was
testimony that certain personnel and their functions within the O.S.S.
were classified information.' 51  In determining whether the defendant
had violated the statute, the jury was allowed to consider the testimony
that the information was classified. Nevertheless, the fact that classi-
fied information was involved did not alter the need for the government
to prove damage to national security, as evidenced by the trial judge's
statement:
It is not the function of the court, where reasonable men may dif-
fer, to determine whether the acts do or do not come within the
ambit of the statute. The question of the connection of the infor-
mation with national defense is a question of fact to be determined
by the jury as negligence upon undisputed facts is determined. 1 52
The most recent case, United States v. Drummond,53 applies
these principles most clearly. The court of appeals stated: "The gov-
ernment acknowledges that it was for the jury to decide whether the
documents defendant conspired to transmit were of such a character
[relating to national security]."' The jury was shown documents
with the classification on the heading. The important aspect of this
case is the approval of the trial judge's instruction to the jury that
"[w]hether any given document relates to the national defense of the
United States is a question of fact for you to decide. It is not a question
of how they were marked."'5 5
One conclusion to be drawn from Gorin, Soblen and Drummond
is that the question of damage to national security is to be determined
by the trier of fact. Because the criminal cases involved post-publica-
tion sanctions, any damage to national security would have already oc-
curred. Consequently the government would have to prove the dam-
age beyond a reasonable doubt. In a civil proceeding for an injunction,
the damage is still speculative; therefore the government is required
to prove prospective damage only by a preponderance of the evidence.
The other important conclusion from the criminal cases is that sim-
ply showing that material which has been divulged was classified does
not sustain the government's burden of proof of damage to national se-
149. See note 144 supra.
150. 301 F.2d 236, 239 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 354 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1013 (1966).
154. Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 152.
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curity. Thus, communication of classified information is not in itself a
substantive evil of sufficient magnitude to cause the application of a
criminal statute. The government must prove that disclosure of the in-
formation actually would cause damage to national security. As noted
previously, because prior restraints are a more powerful remedy than
criminal penalties the standard for the application of a prior restraint
requires proof of a larger quantum or imminence of danger. Thus for
the CIA to restrain publication of Marchetti's book its required proof
of damage must be stricter than proof for a criminal prosecution ("in-
jury to national security"). Arguably this stricter standard might be
the standard which the government itself suggested in New York
Times: direct, immediate and irreparable damage to national secu-
rity.56.
IV. Balancing the Presumptions
A contract which imposes a prior restraint on speech appears to
contain an inherent contradiction-valid contracts are presumed en-
forceable, yet prior restraints are presumed unenforceable. Overem-
phasizing one presumption unduly minimizes the other. The court in
Marchetti stressed the contract theory, thereby permitting one man's
freedom of speech and the country's right to learn certain information
to be sacrificed to a contract that sought to protect secret information.
However, by overemphasizing the First Amendment the prior restraint
would not be permitted, possibly resulting in the disclosure of truly
harmful secret information. A more careful balancing of the two
theories will protect both of these competing interests from being un-
duly minimized.
First, neither the presumption of the enforceability of a valid con-
tract nor the presumption against prior restraints is an absolute pre-
sumption. Although contracts with valuable consideration are gen-
erally enforceable, one exception is that courts will not enforce con-
tracts wherein the government seeks to restrain the speech or press of
its employees unless the restraint is a reasonable means to protect the
government's interest. 157  In Marchetti's case, the interest to be pro-
tected was national security. The question of reasonableness arises in
determining the extent to which the government must be required to
show prospective damage to national security before a contract restrict-
ing speech may be enforced. Analyzing the case fom the First Amend-
ment perspective, prior restraints are presumed invalid but an excep-
156. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 732 n.2 (1971)
(White, J., concurring), wherein Justice White notes that the government's briefs
suggested the standard of grave and irreparable damage.
157. See notes 68-94 and accompanying text supra.
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tion involving national crises has been recognized. Again the crucial
issue involves the quantum of danger to national security that the gov-
ernment must show before the prior restraint is permissible.
A proper balancing approach could result in a definition of the
quantum of danger which fits the exceptions of both presumptions.
This standard would necessarily be more strict than to permit restraint
merely because an item is classified, and less strict than to require a
showing of "direct, immediate and irreparable harm to national secu-
rity." Balancing therefore sustains the presumptive validity of the con-
tract, but does not permit that contract to be overly broad. At the same
time, the general prohibition against prior restraints is upheld, while
permitting a specified class of exceptions.
The Marchetti contract can easily be interpreted to reach that
balance. Although in paragraph three of the contract Marchetti prom-
ised not to publish or reveal any classified information, 1 8 in paragraph
one he stated that he is familiar with the provisions of the espionage
laws.' Considering these two provisions together, the contract may
be interpreted as a promise not to reveal information which is "damag-
ing to national security." This is the definition of material which is
properly classified "Confidential" and whose revelation could result in
prosecution under section 793(e) of Title 18 of the United States
Code;' this should therefore be the quantum of danger necessary to
justify a prior restraint under Marchetti's contract.
While the above standard seems to be the result actually reached
by the court in Marchetti, there is one crucial distinction: the govern-
ment will be required to prove that the release of the information will
cause damage to national security. Merely showing that the informa-
tion was classified will not suffice as proof of damage, just as it was
not sufficient in the criminal cases.' 61 Requiring the government to
prove damage to national security incorporates one of the underlying
assumptions of New York Times: the passage of time desensitizes clas-
sified material. 62 Thus, much like the material in the Pentagon
Papers, CIA information which is properly classifiable may no longer
be damaging after the operation is over.
The court in Marchetti did not consider the effect of the passage
of time from the classification because it relied on a third presumption,
158. See notes 2, 144 supra.
159. Id.
160. See note 144 supra.
161. See notes 142-56 and accompanying text supra.
162. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended 5 U.S.C.
§§ 552, 552a (Supp. V, 1975), supports this general conclusion by providing for
declassification of classified materials after certain periods of time. Material classified
by the CIA, however, is specifically exempted from the declassification process. 5
U.S.C. § 552(b) (1)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
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the presumption that a government official properly performs his
duties. As noted earlier, this presumption was not applied in New
York Times. Far more importantly, this presumption had never pre-
viously been permitted to sustain the decision of a censoring body, nor
to permit the burden of proof to be shifted to one asserting First
Amendment rights. In all of its First Amendment cases, the Supreme
Court has demanded that the judicial branch have an active role in an
independent determination of the need to abridge a First Amendment
right. Finally, despite the fact that this presumption had never been
applied before, the Marchetti court not only applied it, but it was ele-
vated to the status of a conclusive presumption. The presumption
arose immediately upon the CIA's showing that the material was clas-
sified; Marchetti was not given an opportunity to prove that revelation
of the material would not cause damage to national security.
Insofar as this presumption is inconsistent with the First Amend-
ment, it must be greatly de-emphasized in any balancing. approach.
The presumption might properly be applied when the publication con-
cerns present or prospective operations, but even in those instances the
author should be permitted to offer evidence that revelation of the in-
formation will not cause damage to national security. Given the CIA's
control over most of the information, the author should be able to rebut
the presumption by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
damage to national security will not ensue from the revelation. Fur-
thermore, in extreme situations, the author should be permitted to offer
evidence that the public's right to know the information outweighs the
presumed damage. In such cases the CIA would have to offer its evi-
dence of the prospective damage. Should such instances arise, the au-
thor should have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the information should be revealed despite the prospective
damage.
In those instances where the material sought to be published con-
cerns operations which have been completed, the presumption would
not operate. 163 Because the operation has been completed, the CIA
will now have the burden of proving that publication of the information
will cause damage to national security. In considering the question of
damage, the court should consider evidence of, inter alia, the possibility
that the revelations could endanger lives, jeopardize dealings with other
countries, or impair or inhibit intelligence sources. Among those fac-
163. The question of whether an operation has been completed may itself become an
issue. In light of the increased role of the judiciary suggested herein, this should not be
an insurmountable problem. Since a ruling that an operation has been completed will
simply compel the CIA to come forward with evidence that the revelation will cause
damage, close issues of whether the operation has been completed should be resolved in
the author's favor.
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tors which might weigh favorably for the author are whether the mate-
rial sought to be published discusses general plans, tactics and activities,
or actual specifics, and whether the material discusses operations that
seem to be blatantly illegal.'" Due to the historical presumption
against prior restraints, the fact that the standard has been lowered to
"damage to national security," and the fact that the CIA controls infor-
mation tightly, the CIA should be required to meet the burden of prov-
ing damage to national security by clear and convincing evidence.
The balancing approach outlined above goes far beyond Marchetti
in prohibiting the CIA from restraining speech, but still falls far short
of New York Times. The basic approach has been an attempt to ac-
complish what the contract would logically be permitted to do-force
the author to submit the manuscript prior to publication, and permit
the restraint of damaging information. One result of this balancing ap-
proach will be to require much more work from the court in the deter-
mination of damage to national security. Included in the increased role
of the judiciary is a greater leeway to consider damaged diplomatic re-
lations as damage to national security, but also leeway to consider the
public's right to know. This more significant role for the judiciary
seems entirely consistent with all historical attempts to impose prior re-
straints on expression.
V. Conclusion
A reasonable contract to protect critical secret intelligence sources
and methods would be a most useful tool in protecting national security.
The effective gathering of intelligence information requires that the
CIA be able to protect sensitive information. However, the present
system, which permits too much material to be classified,"' has shown
us that over-classification can provide the CIA with the opportunity
to hide its abuses of power under the cloak of secrecy. To the extent
that the interpretation of the CIA contract was overly broad and an un-
reasonable restraint on Marchetti's freedom of expression and the
164. It would not, of course, be the function of the court to determine the legality of
CIA operations. However, recent revelations concerning covert activities indicate that at
least some of them were blatantly illegal. See SELECT CoMMrrrnE REPORT, supra note
6. There seems to be no reason that the court could not take notice of such illegality.
165. The New York Times reports that William G. Florence, a retired Pentagon
security officer, testified before the Foreign Operations and Government Information
Subcommittee that only "one to five per cent [of currently classified documents] 'must
legitimately be guarded in the national interest.'" Schlessinger, The Secrecy Dilemma,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 12. See Henkin, The Right to Know and
the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 271,
275 (1971) ("Government frequently withholds more and for longer than it has to.
Officials, of course, tend to resolve doubts in favor of nondisclosure.").
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country's right to know, that interpretation of the contract was guilty
of fostering the secrecy syndrome.1 6
However, when the proper standard-requiring a reasonable in-
terpretation of the contract-is maintained, the government's interest
can be better preserved. Secrecy is then no longer the end to be pro-
tected, but the means for protecting national security. The Pentagon
Papers were released, albeit without government approval. Classified
documents were not protected simply for secrecy's sake, no apparent
damage has resulted, and the American public-recipient of the infor-
mation-became better informed. Presumably, knowledge that errors
and abuses of power will not forever be obscured under a secrecy clas-
sification will have a deterrent effect on future abuses.
When classified information is sought to be published in the fu-
ture, the only question should be, "Will it damage national security?"
If the only potential damage is to our intelligence organizations, they
are surely large and well established enough to absorb a shock to the
secrecy system without adverse effects. It seems far less certain that
our system of government can continue to absorb the shock of instances
where secrecy has permitted illegal covert operations, only to have later
revelations show both the illegal activity and the part which secrecy
played in allowing the illegal activities to continue. Thus the deterrent
effect of reporting illegalities, the Congress' and the public's right to
know, and the author's freedom of expression combine to compel the
conclusion that a contract should not be permitted to protect secrecy
in the absence of proof of danger to national security. To otherwise
condone the exhaltation of secrecy in the name of national security is
to ignore the warning of the late Chief Justice Earl Warren:
[T]his concept of "national defense" cannot be deemed an end in
itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power designed to pro-
mote such a goal. Implicit in the term "national defense" is the
notion of defending those values and ideals which set this Nation
apart. For almost two centuries, our country has taken singular
pride in the democratic ideals enshrined in its Constitution, and the
most cherished of those ideals have found expression in the First
Amendment. It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national
defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties
• . . which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile. 167
166. President Ford proposed that many agencies which deal with classified infor-
mation include a secrecy agreement in their employment contracts. Los Angeles Times,
Feb. 19, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
167. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
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